William H. Wharton to {?} Austin, January 6, 1837
Summary: Wharton related some optimistic news concerning independence and annexation. He claimed Britain and France would not object to annexation to the Union and that Secretary of State Forsyth told him confidentially that the only thing preventing annexation were sectional disputes. Wharton believed annexation was only two years off once the North realized its political power was waning. Finally, he described in detail a conversation he had with President Jackson about the latter's message against recognizing Texas independence.
WASHINGTON CITY January 6th 1837
DEAR SIR
Not a line from home up to this date! How long must this continue to be the beginning middle and end of my communication! How long must I be compelled to suffer the great embarrassment which this silence of the grave inflicts upon me!
On the day before yesterday the Hon. Mr. Forsyth addressed me a note requesting an interview (informal of course untill[sic] we are recognized) at the department of State. I attended punctually and he informed me that the object of the interview was to lay before me a despatch[sic] which this government had Just received from Mr. Andrew Stevenson Minister Plenipotentiary near the Court of England. Mr S. stated that in obedience to instructions he had had a special interview with the Premier Lord Palmerston in relation to the part which England was disposed to take in the war between Texas and Mexico. He asked Lord Palmerston if Mexico had not applied to England for aid and intervention and he informed his Lordship very promptly that the United States would not permit the interference of any European power in that contest. His lordship replied that Mexico had applied indirectly, but that his Government had positively refused to to[sic] listen to any propositions on the subject that England would not in any way intervene or interfere and that she was entirely satisfied with the neutral course pursued by the Government of the U.S. since the commencement of the Texian revolution. Mr. Forsyth authorised and indeed req[u]ested me to communicate the purport of this despatch[sic] to my Government. Similar opinions have been expressed by Mr. Fox the English Minister near this Court, and it is believed by those who are best informed on the subject that England anticipates the annexation of Texas to this nation as an inevitable event and is prepared to witness it without opposition or murmuring. Not from Mr. Forsyth but from a source equally official, I have learnt beyond doubt that the French Government take the same view of the matter. The French Minister said during the last summer that his Government had no more right to interfere in regard to Texas than had the government of the United States to interfere in the affairs of Belgium or any other Country bordering on France. So it seems that the fear of offending foreign powers need no longer prevent this government from recognizing or indeed annexing Texas.
In the course of conversation I asked Mr. Forsyth if he thought that a treaty of annexation would be ratified by Congress, after our recognition. I told him that even admitting we were recognized by this Government yet if we were not annexed, if we had to remain independent our best interests demanded that we should be apprised of the fact as soon as possible that we might immediately proceed to institute diplomatic relations with England France etc etc[sic] for the purpose of procuring our recognition forming treaties of amity, commerce etc etc[sic]. I beg that what I am about to state as occurring between myself and Mr. Forsyth and the President will be considered as sacredly confidential. The publication of it under any possible circumstances would be extremely embarrassing and indeed unpardonable for some time to come. Mr. Forsyth replied to me that various conflicting sectional interests in Congress would have to be reconciled before annexation would be agreed to. I answered that I was well satisfied of that, and the object of my question was to learn from him whether in his opinion (after calculating and weighing materially (as no doubt he had done) all the objections and obstacles) a treaty of Annexation made by this Government would be ratified by Congress. He answered in the affirmative but said he thought it would be best done under the administration of a Northern President (Mr. Van Buren for instance)
This you see is a postponement of the subject of annexation untill[sic] another session of Congress probably for several years it may be forever. Our Government will then duly consider whether the issue of the question of annexation is not too distant and doubtful to Justify the postponement of the institution of diplomatic relations with other powers untill[sic] after it shall have been decided. It is said by many and not without foundation that Mr. Van Buren himself is anxious to have the glory of annexing Texas under his administration. I am myself compelled to believe that Mr. Van Buren is in favor of annexation and that nothing under heaven, but the opposition of Texas can postpone it longer than two years at farthest. I predicate my opinion upon information of Mr. Van Burens views derived from his most intimate and confidential friends, also upon the good sense of the Northern Statesmen.
The Northern Abolitionists and fanaticks[sic] will of course always oppose annexation, but the Northern Statesmen who consult the interests of their constituents as much as any other people clearly perceive that even with the present limits of the United States, the preponderance of political power will very soon depart from the North and permanently reside in the South and West. When the North has once and forever lost her political ascendency she will not object to an almost indefinite extension of the agricultural interest of the south and West, for the North will in that case become the Carriers and Manufacturers of a more extensive region which is all that they then will or need aspire to. Again this government cannot and will not consent to see an independent slave holding community existing contiguous consuming as they will the manufacturies [sic] of Europe alone and presenting a formidable rivalry to the Cotton and Sugar growing interest of Louisiana and Missippi[sic] and the whole South. I have other reasons inducing this belief unnecessary to be detailed here. To be brief I believe that this Union will dissolve should the North obstinately oppose the annexation of Texas. The North seeing this and knowing that they would be the greatest sufferers by a division, that their misfortunes would in such case find no market, that their carrying trade would be greatly curtailed, indeed the North finding that they would well nigh starve, would be forced even if against their will into the measure. I have given it as my opinion that annexation cannot be postponed longer than two years unless the people of Texas themselves oppose it. The question for us is will we or can we wait those two years? I design making it my business to see Gen Jackson on the subject to day: I will endeavor to quicken his operations, by telling him what I believe to be true that there is a wish to postpone the question of annexation until after this Session and thereby rob him of the glory of the measure. Understand me I do not in common conversation even hint at annexation now, nor will I until recognition is secured but with friends of undoubted confidence and expanded views I freely discuss the question in all its bearings
I will now proceed to detail to you a confidential conversation had with the President at his own request. Immediately after the appearance of his Texas message, I procured as many of his friends and of the friends of Texas to visit him as I could, to explain to him their surprise and the unusual surprise at the appearance of such a message coming from him and also to dilate upon the immense injury which it inflicted upon Texas so far as her finances and credit were concerned. He became as I was convinced dissatisfied with the position in which his message placed both him and Texas. My object was to obtain his assent to a move in Congress by his friends recommending to him the immediate recognition of our independence. In this I have succeeded. After many interviews between him and our friends on the subject of his message I called in obedience to his request. As soon as we met I commenced addressing his sense of Justice. I told him that his message had done us as much injury as he could possibly do us unless he were to unite his arms with Mexico and invade us. That it struck at the root of our credit. That without recognition we were begging off our public lands with great difficulty at fifty cents per acre, that with it we could dispose of any quantity at one dollar per acre. That we could get what supplies we wanted, build vessels etc etc[sic] with recognition. That we could immediately negotiate our 5 millions loan etc[sic] That he was mistaken in supposing that a delay to recognize would do neither party any harm. Of course it would do Mexico no harm, That it would please and animate her. That the Mexicans would have his message printed on Satin and circulated through all the Country. That it would disanimate[sic] our friends. That nothing but God himself could defeat our ultimate independence, but that his message would make our road to the attainment of it longer and more thorny. I asked him if he did not conceive us a de facto Government with ample physical ability to maintain our independent national existence. This he did not pretend to question. I told him that we in Texas unanimously thought that this was all that he would inquire into and finding this to be true that he would fearlessly assert it and recognise us regardless of what Mexico or England or any other power might say.
He replied that the object of his message was to obtain the concurrent action of Congress on the subject. I answered a majority of Congress were in favor of immediate recognition, but that many of the administration party forbore acting for fear of its being considered (after his message) as an attack on the administration. He said that that was all foolishness, he doubted the power of the President to recognize of himself he wished the sense of Congress on the subject and would immediately concur if a majority recommended it. This was all I wanted. His friends will move on the subject during the coming week unless something extraordinary occurs. I hope and believe all will go well and we will be recognized. During the conversation he observed that Santa Anna was still President of Mexico and that If I could make a treaty with him especially through the Charge de Affaires of Mexico now at Philadelphia, that it would be valid. I answered that our claims for recognition were predicated on higher grounds than on any thing Santa Anna could or would do, but that of course I would make all out of him that I could. In regard to recognition however I observed that we claimed it as a right on the score of our being a de facto Government with ability to maintain ourselves and that I respectfully conceived that this Government was bound in Justice and in accordance with former usage to extend to us the sheer Justice of a recognition without reference to any thing Santa Anna could or would say or do. Thus we parted. I repeat it again and again, that Genl. Jackson impressed upon me the importance of the most sacred confidence in regard to our interview which I hereby wish to reimpress upon you. Mr. Forsyth exhibited to me a complaint of the Mate and some other officers of the Brig Pocket, which must be attended to. I told him it was all false I knew,--but I would lay it before our Government and obtain a history of that whole transaction. A Dr. Plantom herewith sends on an invention of his own in reference to railways Canals ect[sic]. He wishes a patent from our Government. The complaint it is said we are about making to this Government in regard to the African Slave trade, has already silenced our traducers and rendered us great service
I have the honor to be
Yours etc
Wm. H. WHARTON
Copied in books of legation
J. M. WOLFE
Secry.
Source Copy Consulted: William H. Wharton to {?} Austin, January 6, 1837, in George Garrison, ed., Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas, Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1908, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1911), 3 vols., 2:168-172